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DOWN AND OUT IN WESLACO, TEXAS AND
WASHINGTON, D.C.: RACE-BASED
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FARM WORKERS
UNDER FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCEt
Laurence E. Norton II*
Marc Linder**
This Article explains how federal law excludes half of the
nation's farm workers from the unemployment insurance (UI)
system. It describes how even those fortunate enough to work in
covered employment often lose their benefits when employers use
crew leaders who fail to report wages and pay unemployment
insurance taxes. This discriminatory treatment of farm workers is
then shown to be racially motivated and to have a disproportionate
impact on the non-White majority of agricultural workers. Today's
partial exclusion of these workers from UI is a legacy of Congress's
complete exclusion of farm workers from all New Deal legislation
intended to preserve the racist plantation society of the Jim Crow
South. Finally, to correct the racial and social injustice of this
discrimination, two simple changes in the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA) are proposed.
INTRODUCTION
[F]armworkers ... are at the bottom of the economic
structure. They are faced with trying to make a living in
an occupation with fewer and fewer jobs, one characterized
by hard physical labor, low pay, and seasonal layoffs. Their
exclusion from coverage is not only discriminatory, it
denies the program's protection to a segment of the work
force that needs it most.'
t Copyright 1996 Larry Norton and Marc Linder, all rights reserved.
* Attorney, Farm Worker Division, Texas Rural Legal Aid and Central
Pennsylvania Legal Services. B.A. 1966, Yale College; L.L.B. 1969, Yale Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Of Counsel, Texas Rural
Legal Aid. B.A. 1966, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1973, Princeton University; J.D.
1983, Harvard Law School.
1. NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT 26 (1980) [hereinafter NCUCI.
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Discrimination against farm workers under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act of 19542 (FUTA) exemplifies the failure
of our political and economic system to function democratically
and justly. Neither reason nor equity can explain the continued
exclusion of multitudes of farm workers from federal and state
unemployment insurance protection. This discrimination can
be explained only by the undemocratic, special interest power
of agricultural employers and the advantage that New Deal
racial bigotry has given them.3 Despite repeated independent
studies,4 each of which has led to recommendations that the
FUTA should be changed to cover farm workers on the same
basis as workers in other industries,5 the discrimination con-
tinues. Why? There are two answers.
The first, though distasteful, is hardly surprising. Economi-
cally weak members of racial minority groups have great
difficulty obtaining just results in Congress and state legisla-
tures against well-organized, powerful opponents. This scenario
is played out frequently on various issues and is a well-recog-
nized defect in a political democracy with huge discrepancies
in wealth and power.
The second reason for the continuing discrimination is not
so well understood, and it gives its agricultural-employer-
beneficiaries another built-in advantage. Agricultural employ-
ers benefit from the status quo: sixty years of de jure federal
preferences in the form of either exemption from or special
treatment under most federal labor, wage, and social welfare
laws enacted under the New Deal.6 In addition, as described
below, the history of federal preferential treatment for growers
and discrimination against farm workers, i.e., agricultural
2. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 439 (originally enacted as Title IX of the Social
Security Act, 49 Stat. 639, it is now codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311
(1994)).
3. See infra Part III.
4. E.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE 13 (1995)
[hereinafter ACUCI; COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURAL WORKERS at xxviii (1992); NCUC, supra note 1, at 27.
5. See, e.g., NCUC, supra note 1, at 27 ("The Commission recommends that
services performed by workers in agriculture be included under the provisions of the
FUTA relating to all other workers in general.").
6. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS & MINIMUM WAGES: REGULATING
THE EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 127-75 (1992)
(describing the "racist underpinning" of the New Deal constituency and the similarly
racist legislation that the then prevailing politics produced).
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exceptionalism,' was founded on racism. It arose from inten-
tional discrimination against southern, Black plantation
workers under the New Deal programs and legislation. The
Jim Crow origin of this 1930s disparate treatment underlies
each of the preferences growers now enjoy and requires
reconsideration of all forms of discrimination against farm
workers.
In this Article, we first describe the discrimination against
farm workers in federal social welfare legislation and the
economic impact of this discrimination on the workers. In Part
II, we focus on the ways in which the government subsidizes
farm employers and discriminates against the employees under
the FUTA and state unemployment insurance (UI) laws
through the use of quarterly payroll thresholds and crew
leaders. We explain how such use leaves workers who most
need UI protection without income when they are laid off. Part
III traces the racist nature of farm worker exclusion from New
Deal social welfare legislation. We will show that such dis-
crimination was both a political accommodation to the Jim
Crow plantation economy of the South, needed to pass sweep-
ing New Deal reforms, and an expression of the racist nature
of Congress itself during the New Deal. In Part IV, we present
data demonstrating the disproportionate impact that farm
worker exclusions have on Black and Mexican-origin workers.
Finally, we propose simple, long overdue amendments that can
be made to the FUTA to stop racially based discrimination
against farm laborers.
I. FARM WORKERS IN AMERICA
Proposals to reform the welfare system emphasize work, its
practical rewards, and the intangible benefits to families of
having adults working, rather than living on public assistance.8
7. See id. at 125-27 (describing how the exclusion of predominantly Black and
Latino farm workers from the overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
resulted from the institutional racism of certain New Deal legislation).
8. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Failure of Our Best Intentions, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 1995, at Cl ("The focus today is on restructuring welfare so that it encourages
the poor to work, to have fewer babies out of wedlock and otherwise change their own
behavior so that they cure their own ills. The goal is to bring about a spiritual
rejuvenation of the underclass.... ."); Greg McDonald, Clinton Denounces Orphanage
Proposal as Bad for Families, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 11, 1994, at A2 (" 'For millions and
Farm Workers and UI
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Perhaps the group of workers best exemplifying the ethic we
encourage is farm laborers. In the labor marketplace, farm
workers sell only their willingness to work hard, dedication to
the job, honesty, and, for the years of their youth, good health.9
As an occupation that consists mostly of performing repetitive
tasks that can be learned quickly, farm work does not pay
well.' It is for these workers with little bargaining power that
federal labor, wage payment, and social protective statutes are
most needed. But it is against these hard-working and vulnera-
ble workers that federal law has discriminated."
More than ever, it is ironic that these workers find their
labor devalued by both the marketplace and the law. Unlike
other workers, they have no federal protection from discharge
if they attempt to organize to bargain collectively. 2 They are
excluded from federal overtime and maximum hour coverage, 3
though some farm laborers work as many as one-hundred
hours per week.' 4 Because of the so-called "small farmer"
exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 15
nearly two-thirds of all farm workers are left unprotected by
the federal minimum wage.'6
millions of people, the system is broken badly, and it undermines the very val-
ues-work, family and responsibility-that people need to put themselves back on
track' . . . . [11f the system is going to be fixed properly, reform efforts should
strengthen families ... ." (quoting President Clinton)).
9. See Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
10. See id. at 1544-45 (referring to the work of migrant farm workers).
11. See generally LINDER, supra note 6, at 125-75 (analyzing the discriminatory
impact of New Deal legislation on Black farm workers); see infra notes 88-104 and
accompanying text.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (excluding agricultural labor from the definition
of "employee").
13. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213(b)(12) (1994).
14. This estimate is based on the authors' personal experiences representing
migrant and seasonal farm workers.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1994). The exemptions under both the FLSA and
the FUTA are phrased in terms of the number of employees, man-days and employees
per week, or the amount of payroll. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(2) (1994). A grower can
have many employees and receive the subsidy that this employment tax break
provides so long as the employer meets the flexible requirements of the statutory
language. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. In addition, many farm own-
ers have extensive operations, computerized recordkeeping, hundreds of thousands
of dollars in equipment and sales, and yet under these definitions they are exempt
as "small farmers" because their payroll remains under the preferential statutory
threshold. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(2) (1994).
16. See James S. Holt et al., Coverage and Exemptions of Agricultural Employ-
ment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in 4 REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY
COMM'N 377, 422 tbl. 5.5 (1981) (suggesting that in 1980, nearly 53% of non-family
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Even when it comes to Social Security and unemployment
insurance (UI) protection, these working people are often left
out. "Small farm" employers are exempted and farm workers
employed by these farmers are excluded from UI.'7 Under both
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act 8 (FICA) and the
FUTA, farmers may avoid making social security and unem-
ployment contributions for their farm laborers by using "crew
leaders" to pay their workers.' 9 These intermediaries often fail
both to report wages and to pay FICA and UI taxes, but federal
laws allow their use to insulate farm employers from liability.2 °
As a result, farm workers lose their Social Security and UI
coverage.
Farm workers are the lowest paid occupational group in the
country.2' More than fifty percent of all workers in crop produc-
tion live in poverty.22 Thirty-six percent own no property other
than personal belongings.23 While market forces, such as
oversupply,24 contribute to their destitution, exclusion of farm
farm workers were excluded from federal minimum wage coverage under the FLSA,
allowing employers to pay these workers less than the minimum wage). The minimum
wage is currently $4.25 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1994). A more recent study
suggests that in 1989 closer to 62% of farm workers were excluded from federal
minimumwage coverage. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 25
tbl. 7 (1990).
17. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(2), (c)(1) (1994).
18. 68A Stat. 415 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102, 3111, 3112,
3121-3128 (1994)).
19. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(o), 3306(o) (1994). Under the FICA and the FUTA, a
"crew leader" is defined as an individual who furnishes workers to another person (the
grower) to perform agricultural labor, if such individual pays the workers and no
written agreement exists between the individual and the grower designating the
individual as an employee of the grower. Under these conditions, the workers are
considered the employees of the crew leader for FICA purposes and not the grower.
See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(o) (1994). Although these conditions are not legally sufficient
to treat workers as employees of the crew leader for FUTA purposes, as a practical
matter this loophole is also available to farmers to avoid paying UI taxes. See infra
Part II.B.
20. See id.; see infra Part II.B.
21. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Money Income of House-
holds, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1992, in CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, 152 tbl. 32 (1993). Mean earnings for male non-
managerial farm workers were $8010 in 1992. Id. The next lowest paid occupation
was food preparation and service, with mean earnings of $8183. Id.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
SURVEY (NAWS) 1990, at 53 (1991) [hereinafter NAWS].
23. Id. at 46.
24. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MIGRANT FARMWORKERS: PURSUING SECURITY IN AN
UNSTABLE LABOR MARKET 38 (1994) [hereinafter MIGRANT FARMWORKERS] (finding
that "[alt any point in the year, there is a plentiful supply of farmworkers (at least
190,000, or 12% of farmworkers) in the United States that are not working").
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workers from equal protection under federal law greatly
impedes an increase in their standard of living.25 If their
exclusion from coverage under the FLSA and the FUTA were
eliminated, annual farm worker earnings would increase by
twenty-five percent.26 This increase would result from: (1) an
increase in average hourly wage, caused by coverage of all farm
work under the federal minimum wage; (2) an increase in pay
for hours worked in excess of forty per week, caused by cover-
age of all farm work under federal overtime provisions; and (3)
an increase in income between periods of employment, caused
by universal coverage under the FUTA.
Discrimination against farm workers has a racist origin.27
Correcting the injustice of the racism in the unemployment
system would point the way toward ending the substandard
labor and social conditions of the agricultural labor market. If
we want to make work pay, it is time that these low-wage
workers get the minimal protection afforded to all other
workers.
25. Id. at 32 (finding that farm workers seldom receive benefits, such as food
stamps and cash assistance, from the welfare system). Although unemployed nearly
half the year, on average, and although half these working families live below the
poverty line, 77% did not receive any government assistance in the past two years.
Id. Food stamps, the most commonly used form of government aid, was used by only
22% of farm worker households in the past two years. Id. Eighty percent of those
interviewed were legal residents. Id. at 32-33.
26. A 13.7% increase in earnings would result from federal overtime coverage.
Holt et al., supra note 16, at 463, tbl. 8.10. An 8% increase would result from non-
discriminatory minimum wage coverage. MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, COVERAGE OF AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE, PART II, at 3, tbl. 3, 14, tbl. 14 (1981) (noting
that a differential of approximately 13% was found between covered and uncovered
farmwages, for field workers, $3.65 and $3.22, respectively; currently, uncovered farm
work constitutes approximately 60% of all farm labor) (calculations by authors). In
California in 1992, for example, crop employees received total wages of $2.8 billion
and unemployment benefits of $190 million, seven percent of total wages. California
has nondiscriminatory coverage of farm workers under UI. See Philip L. Martin, The
H-2A Program and Unemployment Insurance 17, 24 (Aug. 22, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Thus,
if the FUTA were amended, and all other states were prompted to cover the 60% of
farm workers presently not protected by UI, see infra note 34, this change would
increase earnings of farm workers in these states by approximately 4.2% (7% times
0.60). Since workers outside California represent two-thirds of all farm workers,
Martin, supra, at 23, a 2.8% increase in total farm worker wages could be expected
from nondiscriminatory coverage under the FUTA.
27. See infra Part III.
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II. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FARM WORKERS
UNDER THE FUTA
Until January 1, 1978, the FUTA completely excluded farm
laborers from federal unemployment insurance protection.28 No
FUTA taxes were imposed on agricultural employers.29 States,
of course, were free to impose taxes on their own agricultural
employers and provide benefits to their own agricultural
workers, but, with the exception of California's near universal
coverage of farm workers in 1976, this did not happen.
Like many other proposals dealing with UC, proposals for
extending coverage to farmworkers have faced a key obsta-
cle at the State level: the fear that a State's action would
place its employers and industries in an adverse competi-
tive position with neighboring States. °
Since 1978, farm work has been covered in a limited fashion,
including work only when it is performed by the largest farm
operators and when these operators have chosen not to use a
crew leader to hire and pay workers.3
Two provisions of the FUTA currently provide an exemption
to agricultural employers. First, growers must pay $20,000 in
farm wages in a calendar quarter in order to be covered under
the FUTA, compared with $1,500 a calendar quarter for other
employers.3 2 Second, growers may avoid all tax paying respon-
sibility under the FUTA if they use a crew leader as an inter-
mediary between themselves and the workers.33 As a result,
farm workers working for one or more exempt employers
28. See Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 2667, 2668, 2670 (1976) (effective on remuneration paid after December
31, 1977) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(1) (1994)).
29. See id. § 114, 90 Stat. 2667.
30. See PHILIP BOOTH, COVERAGE OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND RESEARCH 674 (1980).
31. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a) (1994) (defining employer as a person who paid
wages of $1500 or more) with 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(1) (1994) (defining agricultural
employer as one who paid $20,000 or more in wages).
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(o) (1994).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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during the course of a year are left either entirely uncovered
by unemployment insurance or receive reduced benefits when
they need them.3
A. The $20,000 per Quarter Payroll Threshold
The FUTA's definitions of both "employer"35 and "employ-
ment"36 include agricultural labor only when performed for
persons who either: (1) have paid wages for agricultural labor
of $20,000 or more in any calendar quarter of the current or
preceding calendar year; or (2) have employed at least ten
individuals in agricultural labor for some portion of a day
during at least twenty separate calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year.37 All other workers are covered
under the FUTA if their employers either pay wages of $1500
in a calendar quarter or employ at least one person for one or
more days during each of twenty separate weeks, in either the
current or preceding calendar year.3 8 Thus, under this scheme,
34. The amount of farm employment not covered under the FUTA as a result of
the $20,000 threshold for employer coverage is subject to dispute. The Minimum Wage
Study Commission estimated that 56-62% of farm workers are excluded due to the
"small farmer" and hand harvest exemptions under the FLSA. See Conrad F. Fritsch,
Exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act: Agriculture, Agricultural Services and
Related Industries, in MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMN, REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
STUDY COMMISSION 97, 98-99 (1981). More recent studies of farm worker coverage
under the FLSA conclude that 64% of farm workers are uncovered. See EMPLOYMENT
STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 25 tbl. 7 (1990) (data from 1989), 27 tbl. 7
(1993) (data from 1990). Ninety-seven percent of farm workers excluded from coverage
under the FLSA are excluded because of the "small farmer" subsidy. See Fritsch,
supra, at 114 tbl. 2. Thus, 60% of all farm workers are excluded from FLSA coverage
by this exemption (0.64 times 0.97=.060). This subsidy exempts farmers employing
workers for fewer than 500 "man days" in any calendar quarter. Holt et al., supra note
16, at 422 tbl. 5.5.
Seven workers working an average of five and one-half days a week in each of a
quarter's 13 weeks is the equivalent of 500 "man days." The wages of these seven
employees working an average of 45 hours a week for 13 weeks at the minimum wage
of $4.25 per hour constitute a quarterly payroll of only $17,400, well within the "small
farmer" exclusion of the FUTA. Thus, if approximately 60% of farm workers are
excluded under the FLSA's 500 "man day" exemption, a somewhat higher percentage
should be excluded under the FUTA as well.
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(2) (1994).
36. Id. § 3306(c)(1).
37. Id. § 3306(a)(2).
38. Id. § 3306(a)(1). The rule for "domestic service" is even more liberal. An
employer is covered if wages of at least $1000 are paid for such service in a calendar
quarter in either the current or preceding calendar year. Id. § 3306(a)(3).
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a grower can employ nine workers for forty hours per week,
throughout the year, at the minimum wage of $4.25 per hour,39
without having to pay FUTA taxes. The grower can have an
annual payroll of nearly $80,000 and remain exempt.4 ° Workers
employed by such a grower are not entitled to unemployment
benefits when they are laid off and are unable to find other
employment. In all other businesses, employers must pay
FUTA taxes and their employees are protected by UI, if the
employer has only one full-time employee who works forty
hours per week for nine weeks at the federal minimum wage.4'
In total, about one-half of all farm workers are left uncovered
by UI.
42
Most states have followed the FUTA and have included the
federal exemption in their own laws.43 Only three states,
39. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1994).
40. This limitation is less than both the $20,000 per quarter threshold and the
10 employees in 20 separate weeks in a calendar year threshold. Because calendar
quarters begin on July 1 and October 1, see 29 C.F.R. § 780.306 (1995), and these
dates often fall in the midst of harvests, agricultural employers can employ 20 or more
workers for harvests that span two calendar quarters and still remain exempt.
41. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1) (1994). Such a situation would result in the
employer paying $1530 in wages, an amount above the $1500 threshold. See supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
42. Approximately 30% of all farm workers in this country work in California and
are covered under California law. Martin, supra note 26, at 23. Of the remaining 70%,
somewhat more than 60% of these workers are not covered in the 43 states that have
adopted the FUTA's $20,000 threshold of coverage. See Fritsch, supra note 34, at 98.
The remaining four states, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Texas, have reduced the
FUTA's discriminatory threshold. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1) (1994) with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 443.036(19)(e)(2) (West 1981) (providing for a threshold of $10,000 in
a quarter or five workers in each of 20 weeks); HAW. REV. STAT. § 383-7(1) (1994 &
Supp. 1995) (providing for coverage where: (1) agricultural employees are employed
in at least 20 different calendar weeks in either the current or preceding calendar
year; (2) agricultural labor is not performed for more than 19 weeks in either the
current or preceding calendar year; and (3) the employer has employed no more than
nine workers in agricultural employment in any one week during either the current
or preceding calendar year); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.04(12), (13)(a)(ii) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996) (providing for a reduced threshold of four workers in each of 20 weeks);
and TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 201.047 (West 1995) (providing for the coverage of migrant
workers, seasonal workers on truck farms, orchards and vineyards, and all other range
and farm labor if a reduced discriminatory threshold of $6250 is met or three workers
are employed in 20 different calendar weeks). We believe that the somewhat expanded
coverage in Florida and Texas, where great numbers of farm workers are employed,
is more than counterbalanced by loss of coverage in all states in which crew leaders
are used. See infra Part I.B. Work performed under these middlemen is increasing
and now covers approximately 30% of the work by the nation's 670,000 migrant
workers. NAWS, supra note 22, at 2, 37. Hence, our estimate is that 50% of farm
workers are currently uncovered by UI.
43. See ALA. CODE § 25-4-10 (1975 & Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055 (1990
& Supp. 1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-617 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-102
(Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-105 (1986 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
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California," Rhode Island,45 and Washington 46 cover farm
workers on the same basis as all other workers, essentially
providing first dollar coverage.47 Consequently, although most
farm workers are unemployed on an average of three months
each year, only twenty-five percent have reported receiving U1
at any point in the two years prior to being surveyed during
1991.48 Although these workers have the greatest need for UI
due to their regular periods of unemployment and low income,
they get the least amount of UI protection and benefits.
B. Grower/Crew Leader Scam
Compounding the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of farm
workers by the FUTA's payroll threshold for farm employer
coverage is the FUTA's loophole allowing growers to avoid UT
obligations by using crew leaders to hire and pay the workers
§ 31-222(H) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 101(b) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
443.036(e) (Harrison 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-35(m) (1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 383-7, -9 (1994 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 72-1316A(a) (1989 & Supp.
1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 321.4 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-
8-2(1)(1) (West 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.19(18)(g)(3) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703(h)(1)(A) (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.055(1)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1472(12)(H) (West 1985 & Supp.
1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 95A, § 8-207 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. L. chs. 151A:6, :8B (1994);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.547(d) (Callaghan 1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 268.04(15) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-11(I)(15)(a) (1995);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.034(12) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-204(a) (1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-604(4), (6) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 612.090 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 282-A:9(IV) (1987 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1991 &
Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.01(A)(1)(d)
(Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 1-210(5) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 753 (1991 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-27-260(16) (Law Co-op.
1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 61-1-24 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-207(7)
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-206(2) (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(A)(vii)
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-214 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-3(12) (1995).
44. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 611 (West 1986).
45. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-42-3(17)(1), 28-42-8 (1995).
46. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.150 (West 1990).
47. See supra notes 32,44-45. California covers work performed for all employers
who have paid at least $100 in wages. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 676 (West 1995).
Rhode Island and Washington cover all the work of each employee. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-42-3(14) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.080 (West 1990).
48. NAWS, supra note 22, at 74; id. at 58 (reporting on "SAS" workers that
include "the vast majority of nursery products, field crops, including cash grains, and
all fruits and vegetables" but exclude beef, poultry, fish and other livestock production,
see NAWS, supra note 22, at 1, n.1).
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harvesting the growers' crops on the growers' land.49 Similar
to a provision in the FICA that allows farmers to avoid paying
Social Security taxes by using crew leaders, ° the FUTA's
loophole has made a mockery of both the interpretation of UI
laws and their enforcement. The result is that, where crew
leaders are used, noncompliance with UI reporting and taxpay-
ing requirements runs rampant.5 ' Growers and crew leaders
benefit by lowering their costs and farm workers lose coverage,
even when, in reality, they work for growers who would other-
wise be covered employers.
Although the FUTA's special rule for farm workers working
under crew leaders is inartfully written, this drafting problem
can neither excuse nor explain its erroneous interpretation and
the erroneous interpretation and application of corresponding
state rules patterned after the FUTA."2 The FUTA rule estab-
lishes a test for determining whether the crew leader or the
person to whom the crew leader provides workers is the "em-
ployer" responsible for reporting worker wages and paying UI
taxes.5 3 Under this test, a grower is the FUTA-responsible
employer if: (1) the crew members are his employees under the
Internal Revenue Service test used to determine common law
employment; 4 (2) the crew leader is not registered as a farm
labor contractor under the federal Migrant and Seasonal
49. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(o) (1994).
50. Id. § 3121(o).
51. See sources cited infra note 60.
52. See Marc Linder, Crewleaders and Agricultural Sweatshops: The Lawful and
Unlawful Exploitation of Migrant Farmworkers, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 213, 226-29
(1990).
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (1994). FUTA taxes are paid to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in the amount of 0.8% of the first $7000 in wages paid to each worker
each year. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3302(c), 3306(b) (1994). Employers report wages of
each worker to state UI agencies in order to credit the worker's earnings' account. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 766 (1992). The wages reported to this account will
determine whether an applicant for UI has sufficient earnings to draw UI benefits
when an unemployed worker applies for benefits. See, e.g., id. § 801. The amount of
wages credited to this account also will determine the amount of weekly benefits the
unemployed worker will receive. See, e.g., id. § 804. If either growers or crew leaders
fail to report wages to the state UI agencies, workers are either denied benefits
altogether or receive less in UI benefits than they are due. Employers also pay state
UI taxes at rates that vary from state to state and from employer to employer, but
which average only 2.5% of taxable wages. See ACUC, supra note 4, at 75-76, tbl. 6-1.
Excludible wages vary from state to state, upward from $7000. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 753(x) (1992) (excluding wages over $8000 after 1984); CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 930 (West 1986) (excluding wages over $7000).
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1994).
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Agricultural Worker Protection Act; 5 or (3) there is an agree-
ment between the crew leader and the grower providing that
the crew leader is the grower's employee. 6
It is important to note that this rule has been adopted by
most states.5 7 Use of the FUTA rule is problematic because it
is confusing, and this confusion has been compounded by
strange variations in state laws." Furthermore, the rule has
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994).
56. The "crew leader rule" provides:
For purposes of this chapter, any individual who is a member of a crew furnished
by a crew leader to perform agricultural labor for any other person shall be
treated as an employee of such crew leader-
(A) if-
(i) such crew leader holds a valid certificate of registration under the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act; or
(ii) substantially all the members of such crew operate or maintain tractors,
mechanized harvesting or crop-dusting equipment, or any other mecha-
nized equipment, which is provided by such crew leader; and
(B) if such individual is not an employee of such other person within the
meaning of subsection (i).
26 U.S.C. § 3306(o)(1) (1994). 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) provides that "the term 'employee'
has the meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)," which refers to the
common law definition of employee. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2).
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-35(m)(4) (1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 383-2 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 72-1315(f) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para.
321.4 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-8-2(l)(2) (West 1991); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 95A, § 68-607 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A, §§ 8C, 14, 45 (1994);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.513 (Callaghan 1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 268.04, .121 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 71-5-11(I)(6)(c), 71-5-351
(1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.034(12)(d), .090,.130 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-51-
206, 39-51-603 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-648, -648.01 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 612.057, .260, .535 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(h) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-42(6)(c) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4141.01(BB) (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 1-210(5) (West 1994 & Supp.
1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 753(1)(3)(G) (1992).
58. Although in most states the special rule for determining the employer where
a crew leader is involved follows the same structure as the FUTA, and although this
structure causes some of the same problems, such as findings that crew leaders, not
farm operators, are the employers of crew members, these laws use different tests to
determine whether the farm operator is the employer. Some states use the common
law test. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-210(a)(1)(B) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995). Some
use the "ABC" test that is otherwise used to determine whether workers are employ-
ees or independent contractors. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.01(BB)(2)(c),
4141.01(B)(1)(b) (Anderson 1994). Other states use the minimum threshold test of
$20,000 in wages paid in a quarter, without reference to any test for determining the
employment relationship between the farm operator and the crew members. E.g., PA.
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generally been interpreted and administered at the state level
to classify crew leaders as the exclusive employers of farm
workers for UI purposes.5 9 Because reporting wages and paying
UI taxes by crew leaders is the exception rather than the rule,
and because state departments of labor have generally given
up investigating these itinerant operators, ° crew members
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 753(l)(3)(G) (1992). Since state unemployment compensation
agencies seldom apply any test correctly, the differences in statutory language cause
only theoretical inconsistencies in outcomes among the states.
59. See, e.g., Macias v. New Mexico Dep't of Labor, 21 F.3d 366 (10th Cir. 1994).
The FUTA provides that the crew leader will be the employer of crew members only
if the crew leader is registered as a farm labor contractor with the U.S. Department
of Labor and the farm operator is not the employer of such crew members. See 26
U.S.C. § 3121(o) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994). Where these two requirements are
not met, the farm operator becomes the employer by default. State agencies, nonethe-
less, typically look only to the registration status of the crew leader and decide that
he is the employer if he is registered. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit recently held that the New Mexico Department of Labor was acting
within its discretion in considering crew leaders as employers under UI, so long as
they were registered with the U.S. Department of Labor. Macias, 21 F.3d at 369. It
may well be that most of the misinterpretation of the crew leader rule results from
a failure to consult the language of the statute and a reliance instead on what is
written about it. As a result, some state agencies have ignored the requirement that
they determine that the crew members are not the employees of the grower before
concluding that the crew leader is the employer. Submissions Answers to Question-
naires at 207-368, Macias v. New Mexico Dep't of Labor (CV 91-0509). The Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation also has made this error. See ACUC, supra
note 4, at 176.
60. See Deposition of Jimmy Sanchez, Unemployment Bureau Chief, at 9, Macias
(CV-91-0509HB) (D.C.N.M. Aug. 5, 1991) ([Iln this particular.., industry, finding
and locating individuals is a problem because of movement. They have got several
addresses, they use other people's addresses, and it seems like they are never where
they should be."); Memorandum from Joe C. Salaz, Enforcement Agent, to Bob
Gieseke, Chief of Tax (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) (exhibit 4 of deposition of Robert Geiseke Aug. 23, 1991, stating that
crew leaders were engaged in "mass civil disobedience of the New Mexico Statutes").
Referring to a plea that the New Mexico Department of Labor (NMDOL) ensure that
wages paid to farm workers furnished by crew leaders to pick chile peppers in
southern New Mexico be reported, counsel for NMDOL stated, "[it] would be an
impossible task at this point to ask the New Mexico Department of Labor to do that."
Statement of Jerry Walz to the U.S. District Court at 20, Macias (CV-91-0509HB)
(D.C.N.M. Mar. 16, 1992).
Our survey of crew leaders in three states that have state registration schemes
showed that, in 1994, few even had state UI account numbers, a prerequisite for
reporting wages and paying taxes. In New York, out of 206 registered crew leaders,
only five had account numbers. Letter from Charles Horwitz, Senior Attorney, New
York Department of Labor, to Larry Norton (June 14, 1994) (on file with the Universi-
ty of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In New Jersey, only 17 out of 167 had
numbers, and in Pennsylvania, only 4 out of 72 had numbers. Telephone Conversation
with Juan Burgos, Esquire, Camden Regional Legal Services (Nov. 11, 1994);
Telephone Interview with Laura E. Reohr, Director, Bureau of Employee Tax Opera-
tions, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (June 27, 1994). These
discrepancies confirm the noncompliance found in New Mexico. The data, however,
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seldom have their wages reported. Thus, treating crew leaders
as employers invites noncompliance and loss of worker UI
coverage. The FUTA should prohibit such treatment.6 1
The combined use of the $20,000 per quarter threshold and
the crew leader scam invites another ruse to cut grower
employment taxes and deprive farm workers of UI coverage.
A large farm operator with hundreds of hand harvesters can
deprive workers of UI by dividing the workers into crews
working under different registered crew leaders, none of which
has a payroll of more than $20,000 per calendar quarter. Each
of the workers in what may actually be a large harvesting
operation will then be excluded from UI coverage under the
"small farmer" exemption.
III. AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM AS RACISM
The FUTA's discriminatory provisions discussed in Part II
have an overreaching impact on some of America's hardest
working laborers. These provisions, however, must be changed
overstate the prevalence of noncompliance, because crew leaders need not have UI
account numbers if: the grower is reporting and paying; the crew leader's payroll does
not exceed the $20,000 per quarter threshold; or, if the crew leader's base of opera-
tions is in another state and he pays UI taxes there. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 753(j)(i), (1)(2), (/)(3)(G)(a) (1992).
61. The 1980 Report of the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation
also recommended that the farm operator be treated as the employer of workers for
UI purposes, unless the farmer and crew leader sign an agreement to the contrary.
NCUC, supra note 1, at 27. If farm operators remain able to disclaim responsibility
for noncompliance where crew leaders are used, they will have an incentive to use
these intermediaries and no legal or economic incentive to ensure that the crew
leaders are reporting wages and paying UT taxes. If, however, the farm operator is
made the responsible employer by law, it can either handle the reporting itself or
delegate the paperwork to its crew leader or to any other employee. If reporting and
payment are not made, however, the farmer remains liable and available for collection
purposes. Therefore, the farm operator will have to take steps to ensure that reports
are filed and that the taxes are paid by its agent. The only additional costs to farmers
from this change will occur where either incomplete or no reporting and payment has
occurred in the past. In such cases, farmers and crew leaders have enjoyed lower costs
resulting from prior nonpayment of UI taxes. The change would properly require them
to report wages and pay taxes on the same basis as their competitors, further ensuring
that all covered employees received UI credits for their work. Thus, farmers who have
benefited from the competitive advantage of incurring no UI costs for work performed
on their property will only lose an unfair competitive advantage. Where crew leaders
have been reporting and paying taxes and the farmers wish to assume this task, under
our proposed scheme, farmers can just reduce payments to the crew leaders in the
amount of the UI contributions. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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for an additional reason: they were racially motivated and have
an extremely disproportionate racial impact. In this Part, we
will trace the racist exclusion of farm workers from its origins
in the Jim Crow South to the acceptance and practice of racism
by the New Deal Congress. We will then, in Part IV, show the
impact of farm worker exclusions on racial minorities, both in
the 1930s and today.
During the past decade, prominent historians,62 sociologists,63
economists, 64 political scientists, 65 and even journalists66 in-the
United States have embraced the view that the exclusion of
agricultural workers from New Deal social legislation was
rooted in the racism peculiar to the political economy of the
South. Because the South was an "oligarchy," and the Roose-
velt administration needed those congressional oligarchs to
report legislation out of the committees that their seniority
enabled them to control, New Deal socioeconomic legislation
had to accommodate the South's economically based White
supremacy. 7 Consequently, according to Jill Quadagno, a
leading Social Security historian, White southern legislators
during the New Deal
opposed any program that would grant cash directly to
black workers, because direct cash could undermine the
62. See, e.g., JILL S. QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDER-
MINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 2 (1994) ("Because of southern opposition, agricultural
workers... most[ly] black men and women ... were left out of the core programs of
the Social Security Act.").
63. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 301 (1995) ("The influence of Southern
agricultural interests in the New Deal depended on the insertion of... [the Democrat-
ic party's] social power as white racial oligarchs into federal political arrangements.").
64. Cf Lee J. Alston & Joseph P. Ferrie, Labor Costs, Paternalism, and Loyalty
in Southern Agriculture: A Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State, 45 J. ECON.
HIST. 95, 97-98 (1985) (arguing that while "outright discrimination" prevented many
Blacks from receiving benefits during the 1930s, "the issue of racism seem[ed] largely
irrelevant" to the exclusion of farm workers from UI).
65. See, e.g., Kenneth Feingold, Agriculture and the Politics of US. Social
Provision, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 199, 206
(Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) ("[O]nly on their 'own peculiar problem' of race were
Southern [New Deal] members of Congress united.") (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 6, 14-15 (1991). "Sharecropping began
in the immediate aftermath of the end of slavery, and was the dominant economic
institution in the agrarian South for eighty years." Id. at 6. "The [Mississippi] Delta
had the largest-scale farming of the quintessential sharecropping crop, cotton. It was
in the state that had the quintessential version of Jim Crow." Id. at 15.
67. See LINDER, supra note 6, at 127-32; SKOCPOL, supra note 63, at 29-31.
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entire foundation of the plantation economy. In 1935 more
than three-quarters of African Americans lived in the
South....
Because of southern opposition, agricultural workers and
domestic servants-most black men and women-were left
out of the core programs of the Social Security Act....
They sought control over any social program that might
threaten white domination, so precariously balanced on
cotton production. 8
Theda Skocpol, a historical sociologist and student of social
policy, has also adopted this view of the racist structure of New
Deal social legislation.
[Tihe South's role [in the New Deal] cannot be understood
without underlining the class structure of Southern cotton
agriculture as a landlord dominated sharecropper system
from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s ....
Nor could we possibly ignore the explicit racism that
ensured minority white dominance over black majorities in
all sectors of economic and social life....
The influence of Southern agricultural interests in the New
Deal depended on the insertion of their class power as
landlords and their social power as white racial oligarchs
into federal political arrangements .... Above all, South-
ern leverage was registered through a congressionally
centered legislative process ... that allowed key committee
chairmen from "safe" districts to arbitrate precise legisla-
tive details and outcomes .... This [came] at the price of
allowing the enactment of only those social policies that did
not bring the national state into direct confrontation with
the South's nondemocratic politics and racially embedded
systems of repressive labor control.69
Margaret Weir, a political scientist who has studied federal
regulation of unemployment programs, similarly concludes
that southern Democrats opposed New Deal programs that
"threatened the planter elite ... and local social and economic
68. QUADAGNO, supra note 62, at 21-22.
69. SKOCPOL, supra note 63, at 29-30.
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relationships-most fundamentally, the laws and customs
governing the low-wage, racially segmented labor force ....
Finally, another political scientist, Kenneth Finegold, special-
izing in New Deal agricultural policy, concurs that "[s]outhern
Democrats ... eliminat[ed] national minimum standards that
might have provided blacks adequate support" because "[elven
a minimal social insurance program might reduce compulsion
to work for low wages" whereas "large landowners . . . bene-
fited from the economic insecurity of their agricultural work-
ers and tenants."71
Because the provisions of the FUTA that discriminate
against farm workers must be studied in the context of their
historical roots, the rest of this Part will discuss the historical
background of the New Deal legislation which included the
development of a UI system. This history will show that the
New Deal Congress intended to discriminate against farm
workers, who were predominantly Black, and thus passed laws
which appeared racially neutral but were actually discrimina-
tory in practice.
A. Jim Crow in the South During the New Deal
Racial discrimination against Blacks during the New Deal
was institutionalized throughout the legal, political, economic,
and social systems of the South. Institutional racism made
possible the successive generations of racist southern congress-
men, who were returned to Congress year after year to pre-
serve these systems.72 The congressmen, both for themselves
and on behalf of their White constituents, would allow no New
Deal reforms to benefit Black farm workers,73 who performed
the bulk of the labor on the cotton plantations and on whose
exploitation racist southern society depended.
70. Margaret Weir, The Federal Government and Unemployment: The Frustration
of Policy Innovation from the New Deal to the Great Society, in THE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 65, at 149, 158-59.
71. Feingold, supra note 65, at 209, 211.
72. See Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1351-52 (1987).
73. See LINDER, supra note 6, at 130-32.
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The New Deal period in the South witnessed the unabated
enforcement of a comprehensive system of legalized discrimina-
tion against Blacks in public facilities. Jim Crow laws separat-
ed Blacks from Whites in schools, railroad cars, street cars,
hotels, restaurants, parks, playgrounds, theaters, and other
public places.74 These de jure forms of racism persisted until
they were toppled by the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and
1960s. Although White supremacists tried to create a legal
justification for Jim Crow by claiming that segregated facilities
were "separate but equal," the schools, hospitals, libraries,
streets, and other municipal services set aside for Blacks were
blatantly inferior-if they existed at all.75
Precisely such discrimination prompted the Executive Secre-
tary of the National Urban League to testify before a congres-
sional subcommittee on unemployment insurance legislation
that one of the reasons his organization opposed committing
administration of the UI program to the states was that "[tihe
experiences of Negroes with State Governments has not been
satisfactory."76 As an example, he adduced the average expen-
ditures by public schools in eighteen southern states, including
Washington, D.C., to show that state spending on Whites far
exceeded that on Blacks." In the mid-1930s, per capita expen-
ditures in education for White children were triple those for
Black children;" in South Carolina, they were ten times as
great.7" The average value of school property per student in ten
southern states was almost five times greater among Whites
than Blacks during 1935-1936.80
Jim Crow laws and the discriminatory misallocation of public
resources were the product of racist decisions made by south-
ern White public officials, who were elected through political
and electoral processes that intentionally excluded all but two
percent of voting-age Blacks. Blacks were, as Gunnar Myrdal
observed during World War II, "[flor all practical purposes...
74. E.g. 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 628 (1944).
75. See, e.g., 2 id. at 581 ("The great difference in quality of service for the two
groups in the segregated set-ups for transportation and education is merely the most
obvious example ....").
76. Unemployment, Old Age and Social Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 2827 Before
the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1935) [here-




80. See 2 MYRDAL, supra note 74, at 947 n.f
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disfranchised in the South."'" Even the minuscule number of
Blacks who voted in the general elections in the Deep South 2
were a political irrelevancy since they were barred from the
discriminatory White primaries of the Democratic Party,
8 3
which in effect constituted the only real elections.8 4 In the
elections for the Seventy-fourth Congress, which enacted the
unemployment compensation program, the Democrats had all
sixty-seven rural seats "in the cotton belt and Southeastern
subtropical coast ... entirely to themselves."85 Potential Black
voters faced such obstacles as financially unbearable poll taxes,
and property, education and "good character" requirements, as
well as flagrantly manipulated rules that Blacks understand
provisions of the Constitution to the "satisfaction" of White
state registrars.8 6 Where such transparent shams failed to keep
Blacks from voting, intimidation, violence, and terror filled in
the gaps. 7
In order to preserve the discipline of the former slave system,
the southern states enacted various statutory schemes to
circumvent the prohibition of involuntary servitude embodied
in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. 8 Although they were repeatedly held invalid by the
U.S. Supreme Court,89 southern states persisted, as late as the
1940s, in reenacting so-called false pretense laws, which forced
farm workers to remain on the plantations by criminalizing the
act of obtaining advances with an intent to defraud and willful-
ly to fail to complete work.9 °
81. 2 id. at 475.
82. 2 id. (including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Texas).
83. Cf Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944) (holding these primaries
unconstitutional). See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAw 99-115
(1994) (providing a history of the White primary litigation).
84. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 74, at 474-90 (1994).
85. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 109
(1940).
86. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 74, at 484.
87. 1 id. at 474-90; THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS 40 (1947) ("In addition to formal, legal methods of disfranchisement, there are
the.., techniques of terror and intimidation.. . .") [hereinafter TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS]; cf RALPH BUNCHE, THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN THE AGE OF FDR
51 (Dewey W. Grantham ed., 1973) ("The social situation and mores of the South
create an atmosphere of essential intimidation for the Negro registrant who presents
himself to what must always be presumed to be hostile officials . . .
88. US. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
89. E.g., Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (invalidating a Florida statute);
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) (invalidating a Georgia statute).
90. See Linder, supra note 72, at 1348-50.
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New Deal social welfare and protective legislation was on its
face racially neutral and applied equally to all races in the
categories it covered.9' Equal treatment of Blacks in the South
under federal law, however, would have conflicted with the
disparate treatment and discrimination against Blacks in
southern institutions, legislation and especially in agriculture,
where an equalizing impact would have benefited Blacks and
injured Whites the most. Because the White South was impla-
cably opposed to all challenges to its system of apartheid, it
resisted the application of labor protective legislation to
agriculture and any statutory reforms that by law would have
mandated equality of the races.
9 2
The institutionalized political and racist imperatives of the
plantation society formed the focal point at which all the
southern forces opposing the application of social security
benefits to Black farm workers converged. The central role of
the plantation in the political economy of the South meant that
the conferral of mandatory protection against the vicissitudes
of old age and unemployment, and later the imposition of wage,
hour, and child labor standards, on plantations would have
destroyed the underpinnings of the entire southern racist
regime.9'
In 1938, President Roosevelt, himself an adopted Georgian
who paid his own Black farm workers the equivalent of six to
eight cents an hour,94 suggested that the regime was a "feudal
system" little different from Fascism.95 Three years after he
signed into law the social security legislation that resulted in
the exclusion of Black farm workers, President Roosevelt took
great pains to assure southern White racists that he would not
then turn around and confer minimum wage and overtime
protection on Black farm workers. At a press conference, he an-
nounced that, contrary to the claims of southern business
associations, "[o]f course, there has never been any thought of
including field labor in the Wages and Hours Bill."96 Lest his
91. See, e.g., Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 811, 49 Stat. 620, 639 (1935) (defining
employment without racial distinction).
92. See, e.g., Feingold, supra note 65, at 206-09.
93. LINDER, supra note 6, at 156, 174-75.
94. FRANK FREIDEL, F.D.R. AND THE SouTH 68 (1965).
95. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The United States is Rising and is Rebuilding on
Sounder Lines, Address at Gainesville, Georgia (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: 1938, at 164, 167-68 (Samuel
I. Rosenman ed., 1941) ("If you believe in the one, you lean to the other.").




bid for racist support be overlooked, he became even more
explicit. Quoting from full-page ads placed by the southern
lumber industry in women's magazines warning housewives
that, "'[i]f the Wages and Hours Bill goes through, you will
have to pay your negro girl eleven dollars a week,"' Roosevelt
explained that the New Deal had no intention of interfering
with the background conditions shaping the labor market in
the South: "[You know if you come from the South, you can
employ lots of excellent domestic help in the South for board
and lodging and three or four dollars a week. No law ever
suggested intended a minimum wages and hours bill to apply
to domestic help."97
The race-based exclusion of farm workers from Social Securi-
ty was part and parcel of the New Deal's discriminatory
treatment of southern Blacks under the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority.98 Even the Farm Security Admin-
istration, which a major historian of the New Deal has charac-
terized as "scrupulously fair in its treatment of the Negro [alt
the risk of its political life,"99 conformed to the law of apartheid
by operating segregated farm labor camps for black and white
workers.' 0 The federal government's administration of the New
Deal in the South unabashedly supported the region's racist
Jim Crow institutions, some of which federal agencies openly
adopted nationwide. The Federal Housing Administration's
loan guarantee program, for example, encouraged the use of
restrictive covenants to prohibit "occupancy of properties except
by the race for which they were intended" and to prevent "the
infiltration of ... inharmonious racial groups" and "nuisances
... such as ... pig pens."1 '
The common theme running through each of these exclusions
or otherwise discriminatory provisions is a congressional intent
97. Id. at 297.
98. LINDER, supra note 6, at 132-53.
99. William E. Leuchtenberg, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL:
1932-1940, at 141 (1963).
100. Letter from Allison T. French, Manager, Employment Service Office, to Dr.
Fons A. Hathaway, Director, Florida State Employment Service (Feb. 18, 1941)
enclosure (Mar. 14, 1941) at 2, in Records of the War Manpower Commission, Bureau
of Placement, Rural Industries Division, General Records of the Farm Placement
Service, 1939-1946, State (Fla.), 1941 folder, National Archives, RG 211, Box No. 5,
Entry 198 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
101. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL 1 935, 980(3) (1938).
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to preserve for the plantation oligarchy a virtually inexhaust-
ible supply of Black labor deprived of any alternative to work-
ing for starvation wages.1 °2 The Works Progress Administration
(WPA), which employed a total of eleven Blacks among its
more than 10,000 supervisors in the South,10 3 typified the
impact of the New Deal in reinforcing unconstitutional state
legislation designed to prevent Black farm workers from
escaping their collective masters. The WPA accommodated the
needs of plantations by means of a racially bifurcated wage
structure that deterred nonwhite workers from remaining on
its rolls and a policy of expelling Black and Mexican-origin
workers from its rolls whenever planters demanded an immedi-
ate supply of the cheapest possible labor.'0 4
The exclusion of farm workers from old-age pensions and
unemployment compensation was an absolute prerequisite, not
for the U.S. farm sector in general, but for the continued
existence of the southern plantation system, which depended
for its survival on the unimpeded, unconstitutional, and
terroristic exploitation of a largely Black labor force at wages
far below the national average. The plantation owners-who
included a number of well-placed congressmen-could maintain
their power only by preserving their quasi-feudal control over
their formerly slave labor force. 105
102. See LINDER, supra note 6, at 125-26, 132.
103. DONALD S. HOWARD, THE WPA AND FEDERAL RELIEF POLICY 291-96 (1943).
104. See id. at 291-92; GEORGE B. TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH
1913-1945, at 479-80, 548 (1970).
105. See QUADAGNO, supra note 62, at 21-22. The growing acceptance of this
interpretation of the centrality of economically rooted southern agrarian racism for
the origins of New Deal social legislation can be gauged by its popularization and
incorporation into the prize-winning book of journalist Nicholas Lemann. LEMANN,
supra note 66. Based on his in-depth study of people who migrated to Chicago from
the Mississippi Delta, the center of the sharecropping system, where "all the
sharecroppers were black and lived in self-contained plantation communities ...
where the conditions were much closer to slavery than to normal employment," id.
at 11, Lemann arrives at the same conclusions as the aforementioned scholars:
The issue of the labor supply in cotton planting may not sound like one of the
grand themes in American history, but it is, because it is really the issue of
race .... For hundreds of years, the plurality of African-Americans were
connected directly or indirectly to the agriculture of cotton ....
•.. The political institution that paralleled sharecropping was segregation;
blacks in the South ... beginning in the 1890s ... were denied the ordinary
legal rights of American citizens .... Segregation strengthened the grip of the
sharecropper system by ensuring that most blacks would have no arena of
opportunity in life except for the cotton fields ....
[VOL. 29:1&2
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996] Farm Workers and UI
B. The Legislative History of the Racist Exclusion
of Farm Workers from Social
Security / Unemployment Insurance
Although realism about racism today may penetrate popular
consciousness, the legislative mind has always been much more
comfortable explaining the ongoing exclusion of farm workers
from the unemployment insurance system in the United States
by reference to more neutral-sounding considerations. The two
most frequently proffered explanations, or rather excuses, for
exclusion of farm workers from the unemployment compensa-
tion system have been alleged administrative difficulties °" and
the benign nature of the family farm.0" Yet the fact that the
programs of many, if not most, other advanced economies in
Segregation's heyday and sharecropping's heyday substantially coincided.
Together the two institutions comprised a system of race relations that was...
just as much a thing apart from the mainstream of American life as slavery had
been ....
Every big plantation was a fiefdom; the small hamlets that dot the map of the
Delta were mostly plantation headquarters rather than conventional towns.
Sharecroppers traded at a plantation-owned commissary, often in scrip rather
than money. ... Their children walked ... to plantation-owned schools . ..
without heating or plumbing. Education ended with the eighth grade .... The
planter could and did shut down the schools whenever there was work to be done
in the fields....
... There was no brake on dishonest behavior by a planter toward a sharecrop-
per. For a sharecropper to sue a planter was unthinkable. Even to ask for a more
detailed accounting was known to be an action with the potential to endanger
your life. The most established plantations were literally above the law where
black people were concerned. The sheriff would call the planter when a matter
of criminal justice concerning one of his sharecroppers arose, and if the planter
said he preferred to handle it on his own (meaning, often, that he would
administer a beating himself), the sheriff would stay off the place.
Id. at 6, 14-15, 17-19.
106. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. H5902 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1935) (statement of Rep.
Vinson) (explaining that Title VIII exempts farmers because the tax on wages "would
be inconsiderable and its collection ... a nuisance'); Economic Security Act: Hearings
on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 841 (1935)
[hereinafter Finance Comm. Hearings] (statement of Robert Elbert, South Carolina
plantation owner) ("If farm hands . . . are included it will lead to a terrific question
of administration.').
107. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
200 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the 1930s already included, and today still include, agricultural
employees suggests that such obstacles are hardly insupera-
ble.1
0 8
Indeed, Congress from the outset was well aware that other
countries had already incorporated agricultural workers within
their Social Security programs. Edwin Witte, the executive
director of the Committee on Economic Security (CES), which
President Roosevelt had created to develop Social Security
legislation, submitted with his testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee a table from the CES Report to the Presi-
dent showing that the social insurance laws of Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands all included agricultural
employees.'1 9 In fact, CES staff reports had recommended
coverage in UI of agricultural workers including sharecroppers
on the same basis as industrial workers in part by reference
to their inclusion in European social insurance programs
during the 1930s. 11'
Forty years later, an international review of unemployment
insurance coverage pointed out that, unlike the United States,
countries such as Canada, West Germany, Israel, and Norway
maintained no specific occupational exclusions."' Other coun-
tries, including France, Italy, and Spain, have created separate
programs to accommodate the seasonality of agricultural
work. 112
108. By 1936, for example, Great Britain had included agricultural employment
in its Unemployment Insurance Act. Unemployment Insurance (Agriculture) Act, 26
Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, ch. 13, § 12, sched. 5 (1936) (Eng.).
109. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 106, at 51; see also Economic Security
Act: Hearings on H.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 78-79 (1935) [hereinafter House Hearings] (detailing provisions of foreign
old-age pension laws through 1933). The Social Security plans of Austria and France,
however, were less explicit. See Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 106, at 51
(showing that Austria had "special schemes for agricultural workers" and that France
limited coverage for farm workers' benefits during old age and upon death).
110. Louis H. Bean, The Economic Security Program in Relation to Farm Operators
and Employees, in 6 COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 802 (Dec. 12, 1934) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SECURITY]; Natalie
F. Jaros, AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN FOREIGN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEMES,
in ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra, at 868, 869 (Nov. 1934); William T. Ham, The Bearing
of the Program of the Committee on Economic Security upon Farmers and Farm
Laborers, in ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra, at 872 (Nov. 20, 1934); Lee J. Alston &
Joseph P. Ferrie, Labor Costs, Paternalism, and Loyalty in Southern Agriculture: A
Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 95, 108-13 (1985).
111. SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN & ISABEL CRAIG, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMPLOYMENT
RESEARCH, AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEMES 26
(1977).
112. Id. at 88.
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Soon after the Social Security Act went into effect, the Social
Security Board (Board) began examining the empirical plausi-
bility of the other major policy reason for excluding farm work-
ers, namely the benign nature of the family farm:
The reluctance to extend the operation of social legislation
to agricultural labor appears to be closely associated with
the general feeling that agriculture in the United States is
predominantly a family enterprise in which hired labor
plays a relatively unimportant part. It is often pointed out
that when only one or two hired hands are employed on a
farm, they usually enjoy a close personal relationship with
their employer which tends to assure them of more favor-
able consideration than is usual in ordinary employer-
employee relationships.
... It is therefore particularly important to know if, where,
and to what extent agricultural wage workers are employed
on farms singly or in very small groups, on the one hand,
and in larger numbers, on the other." 3
In order to test this family farm thesis, the Board caused the
Bureau of the Census to make special tabulations of the 1935
Census of Agriculture to determine the distribution of farms
and workers by number of hired laborers per farm." 4 The data
revealed that behind the general picture of the family farm lay
"conceal[ed] the fact that a relatively large number of hired
farm laborers were on farms employing hired labor in substan-
tial numbers, and that these hired laborers were concentrated
on a very small number of farms."" 5 In January 1935, 18% of
all workers were employed on 0.2% of all farms, which ac-
counted for 2% of all farms with hired labor." 6 Estimates for
July of the same year were similar: 20% of the workers were
employed on 0.4% of all farms, which in turn accounted for 2%
of the farms that hired workers." 7
113. Julius T. Wendzel, Distribution of Hired Farm Laborers in the United States,
45 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 561, 561 (1937).
114. Because covered employment under the federal unemployment insurance
scheme was originally defined by reference to employers who hired eight or more
individuals, the Census Bureau and the Board collected data on farms reporting eight
or more hired laborers. Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 907(a), 49 Stat. 620,642 (1935);
Wendzel, supra note 113, at 561-62.
115. Wendzel, supra note 113, at 561-62.
116. Id. at 564 tbl. 1, 565 tbl. 2.
117. See id. at 567 tbl. 4, 568 tbl. 5.
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Congress, in the course of enacting Social Security legisla-
tion, was repeatedly put on notice not only that the exclusion
of agriculture meant the wholesale exclusion of Blacks, but also
that this pattern of racist exclusionism had already become the
hallmark of New Deal programs such as the Public Works
Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Charles
Houston, representing the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), testified to the House
Ways and Means Committee that in the South,
where your Negro population is heaviest, you will find the
majority of Negroes engaged either in farming or else in
domestic service, so that, unless we have some provisions
which will expressly extend the provisions of the bill to
include domestic servants and agricultural workers, I
submit that the bill is inadequate on the unemployment-
compensation provision."8
As part and parcel of the racism he was attacking, Houston
went on to observe that, to the extent that federal programs
relied on local or state entities for administration, they would
have to deal with the South "according to the law [of] separate
institutions ... for Negro and white citizens."" 9 He therefore
urged that Congress insert into the bill a provision that,
"where the money is allocated to the States and by law in
public institutions you have a separation of races, there must
be an equitable distribution between the white and colored
citizens.""' It was precisely the letter and spirit of such racial
equality that southern congressmen succeeded in suppressing
as the price for their cooperation with the Roosevelt adminis-
tration.
In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,
Houston noted that the Social Security bill would exclude 3.5
million of 5.5 million Black laborers because they were em-
ployed either as farm workers or domestics.' 2 ' He then ex-
pressed the NAACP's regret that it could not support the
proposed legislation because "the more it studied the bill the
more holes appeared, until from a Negro's point of view it




121. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 106, at 644.
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look[ed] like a sieve with the holes just big enough for the
majority of Negroes to fall through."22 Manning Johnson for
the National Executive Council of the League of Struggle for
Negro Rights, informed another congressional committee hold-
ing hearings on unemployment insurance that "[plractically 85
percent of the Negroes in the South are agricultural work-
ers."123 The Executive Secretary of the National Urban League
testified to the same committee:
The Negro working population is largely agricultural ....
A little more than 65 percent of all Negroes who were
engaged in 1930 labored as farmers and domestic and
personal servants. Shutting off benefits to farmers and
domestic and personal-service workers would immediately
exclude almost two-thirds of all Negro workers.
124
George Haynes, the Executive Secretary of the Federal
Council of Churches, Department of Race Relations, in urging
the Senate Finance Committee to include a nondiscrimination
clause in the social security bill, stated that in:
the distribution and administration of Federal funds, both
under the regular services furnished by the States with the
help of Federal funds as well as in the emergency measures
that have been carried out under legislation for recovery,
there has been repeated wide-spread and continued dis-
crimination on account of race or color, as a result of which
Negro men and women and children did not share equita-
bly and fairly in the benefits .... 125
Haynes focused on the "inequalities that have arisen in the
cotton-acreage reduction as a part of the recovery program,"
which he deemed especially pertinent "because Negro share
tenants and share croppers are more largely affected than
white share tenants and share croppers by the cotton-acreage
122. Id. at 640-41.
123. Labor Comm. Hearings, supra note 76, at 147 (statement of T. Arnold Hill,
Executive Secretary, National Urban League).
124. Id. at 327.
125. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 106, at 479-80 (statement of George E.
Haynes, Executive Secretary, Department of Race Relations, Federal Council of
Churches).
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reduction conditions."126 Haynes stressed that the extraordi-
nary concentration of Blacks in agriculture and domestic
service meant that "about three-fifths of all Negroes gainfully
employed in the United States will be excluded by the very
terms of this bill from its unemployment and old-age bene-
fits." 127 Commentary is superfluous on the fate of Haynes's
intriguing proposal that in order to compensate for wage
discrimination against Black workers vis-A-vis Whites with the
same jobs: "Wherever there is this discrimination in wages on
account of race or color, this bill should provide an equalization
of the percentage of the tax to be paid by the employee so that
the employer will be required to pay a larger percentage of the
tax."
128
Five years later, the Chair of the committee before which he
was testifying, Senator Byron "Pat" Harrison of Mississippi,
one of Roosevelt's most reliable legislative leaders, told the
team conducting the Carnegie Corporation's Survey of the
Negro in America: "'The nigra is satisfied down there from a
political standpoint. In my state, the nigra has played no part
in politics for forty years and has no desire to do so. We are all
content to leave the situation alone as it is.' ,129
This legislative history, as interpreted against the back-
ground of the political economy of the South, demonstrates that
the exclusion of agricultural workers from Social Security was
the deliberate result of a congressional decision to ensure that
no federal legislation interfered with the post-slavery statutory
and social subjugation of the
rural Negro in areas of high concentrations of colored
population . . . [where] whites are relatively fewest, that
the plantation system of agriculture is most highly devel-
oped, that the economic system is most dependent upon
black workers, and that the white-black socio-economic
system, commonly thought to be characteristic of the entire
South, is most highly developed....
The maintenance of southern Democratic solidarity has
depended fundamentally on a willingness to subordinate
126. Id. at 485.
127. Id. at 487.
128. Id. at 490.
129. See BUNCHE, supra note 87, at 434-35 (quoting Interview with Senator Byron
Patton Harrison, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 16, 1940)).
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to the race question all great social and economic issues
that tend to divide people into opposing parties.
130
Plantation owners and their representatives had no qualms
about articulating the racism behind their resistance to the
extension of Social Security programs to their laborers, on the
ground that even a modest level of income security and sup-
plement would have tended to raise workers' reservation wage,
thereby weakening confinement to a quasi-captive labor
market.
Southerners worried about [Social Security's] implications
for race relations. "The average Mississippian," wrote the
Jackson Daily News, "can't imagine himself chipping in to
pay pensions for able-bodied Negroes to sit around in
idleness on front galleries, supporting all their kinfolks on
pensions, while cotton and corn crops are crying for work-
ers to get them out of the grass." 1
Congress promptly dispelled southern racist concerns by
excluding agricultural and domestic employees altogether-and
thus the vast majority of southern Black workers-from
coverage.' 32 Yet the indirect exclusion of Blacks from the
old-age pension provisions of the bill did not satisfy southern
congressmen, who bitterly attacked the old-age assistance
provision because it gave the federal government the power to
dictate to the states how much should be paid to whom.3 3 As
the executive director of the CES observed of the congressional
process:
In this position, Senator Byrd [of Virginia] was supported
by nearly all of the southern members of both committees,
it being very evident that at least some southern senators
130. V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS: IN STATE AND NATION 315-16 (1949).
131. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
1932-1940, at 131 (1963) (citation omitted). Even more recently, agricultural
economists have expressed their concern over "[tihe use of unemployment insurance
as 'rocking chair money' to provide additional income to seasonal workers who, by
accident or design, earn enough to qualify for benefits, but whose employment in any
case would be seasonal." Stanley K Seaver & James S. Holt, Economic Implications
of Unemployment Insurance forAgriculture, 56 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1084, 1090 (1974).
132. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 210, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935).
133. See Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 106, at 71-79 (statement of Edwin
E. Witte, Executive Director, Committee for Economic Security).
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feared that this measure might serve as an entering wedge
for federal interference with the handling of the Negro
question in the South. The southern members did not want
to give authority to anyone in Washington to deny aid to
any state because it discriminated against Negroes in the
administration of old age assistance.'34
Senator Huey Long confirmed this point in a speech before the
United States Senate, stating that, so long as they were
without the vote, Blacks in the South would receive no pen-
sions.'35 This racist opposition made it "apparent that the bill
could not be passed as it stood and that it would be necessary
to tone down all clauses relating to supervisory control by the
federal government."'36
This statutory accommodation of southern racism, masked
as states' rights,3 7 was part of "the reluctance of the dominant
race to provide for aged Negroes, Mexicans and Indians [that]
accounted for a part at least of the slowness of the Southern
States, and for the failure of Oklahoma and New Mexico to
take action during the old-age pension movement in Con-
gress."3 ' Since southern mores included "the assumption that
the standard of living of the Negro and his cost of living do not
rise above the barest subsistence ... of the Negro share-
croppers and cotton tenants,"139 "there was a tendency to grant
lower sums, especially in the South, to aged Negroes than to
aged Whites."4 ° The circle of discrimination was completed by
"Itihe lack of federal administrative authority to fix the stan-
dards for personnel selection [which] . . . made it possible for
the Southern States to consistently exclude the negro from any
appointments."'4
In contrast to this statutory accommodation of southern
racism, a set of rival bills, initiated by Representative
134. EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 143-44
(1962).
135. See 79 CONG. REC. S9294 (daily ed. June 14, 1935) (statement of Sen. Long).
136. WITTE, supra note 134, at 144.
137. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 2, 49 Stat. 620, 620 (1935) (allowing the
states to create their own programs, given certain requirements).
138. Frank Davis, The Effects of the Social Security Act upon the Status of the
Negro 198 (1939) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
139. Id. at 157.
140. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO
AMERICANS 538 (3d ed. 1967).
141. Davis, supra note 138, at 198.
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Lundeen, a member of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party,
entitled the Workers' Unemployment, Old Age, and Social
Insurance or the Workers' Social Insurance Act, not only
provided for universal coverage, giving implied parity to
agricultural workers, but also explicitly prohibited discrimina-
tion based on race or color in the distribution of benefits.
142
Indeed, the National Urban League testified that it supported
this alternative bill precisely because "it benefits all workers
irrespective of race [or] color."'43 Six decades later, however,
the scope of this legislative proposal remains unimple-
mented.
144
C. The New Deal Jim Crow Congress
That the United States Congress during the New Deal
enacted the racially motivated exclusion of farm workers from
Social Security legislation was no aberration: the Congress in
the 1930s was itself a profoundly segregated and racially
exclusionary institution. The Seventy-fourth Congress, which
enacted the Social Security Act, like the other New Deal
Congresses, could boast of only a single Black member. 145 The
Congress demonstrated its support of institutional discrimina-
tion against Blacks by approving the funding of segregated
schools in the District of Columbia. Two months before it
passed the Social Security Act, Congress appropriated money
"[flor maintenance and instruction of colored deaf-mutes of
teachable age belonging to the District of Columbia, in Mary-
land, or some other State," as well as for an "industrial home
142. See Social Insurance: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1936) ("The system must... provide
insurance for all workers, including all wage earners, all salaried workers, [and]
farmers .... Compensation... shall not be denied.., by reason of... race [or] color
.") (emphasis added).
143. Labor Comm. Hearings, supra note 76, at 328 (statement of T. Arnold Hill,
Executive Secretary, National Urban League).
144. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage,
Labor Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259, 343-48 (1994).
145. This congressman was Representative Oscar DePriest, a Republican from
Chicago. See Elliot M. Rudwick, Oscar De Priest and the Jim Crow Restaurant in the
U.S. House of Representatives, 35 J. NEGRO EDUC. 77, 77 (1966). Representative
DePriest held office during 1929-1935 and was the first Black congressman of the
twentieth century. Id.
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school for colored children."146 The District of Columbia was,
as the President's Committee on Civil Rights observed as late
as 1947, "not just the nation's capital . . . [but] the point at
which all public transportation into the South becomes 'Jim
Crow.""47 The Committee asserted that "the core of Wash-
ington's segregated society is its dual system of public educa-
tion. It operates under congressional legislation which assumes
the fact of segregation ... 148 Congress mandated racial
segregation for the entire District of Columbia school system
into the 1950s. 149 However, Congress reserved the harshest
discriminatory treatment of Blacks for its own facilities.
Congressionally run and funded public restaurants in the
Capitol excluded Blacks during the New Deal; 50 and as late as
1947, Black journalists were still banned from the press
gallery. 5 '
It was emblematic of southern racist domination of the New
Deal Congress that, just one year before, it enacted racially ex-
clusionary Social Security legislation, representatives con-
ducted a debate on the exclusion of Blacks from the House
restaurant, 152 which had been ordered by the North Carolina
chairman of the committee that oversaw its operation. In the
course of that debate, southern congressmen on the House floor
146. Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 241, 49 Stat. 341, 354, 366.
147. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 87, at 89.
148. Id. at 90.
149. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-1110, -1111 (1940). The statute provided as follows:
It shall be the duty of the Board of Education to provide suitable and convenient
houses or rooms for holding schools for colored children, to employ and examine
teachers therefor, and to appropriate a proportion of the school funds, to be
determined upon number of white and colored children.., and to endeavor to
promote a thorough, equitable and practical education of colored children in the
District of Columbia.
Any white resident shall be privileged to place his or her child ... at any one
of the schools provided for the education of white children in the District of
Columbia he or she may think proper to select ... and any colored resident shall
have the same rights with respect to colored schools.
Id.; see also Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (citing the D.C. Code
as evidence of congressional intent not to desegregate the schools).
150. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 129-30 (1975).
151. Donald A. Richie, Equal Access to the News: Integrating the Washington
Press Corps 1 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for speech at the Annual
Meeting of the Organization of American Historians (Apr. 2, 1992), on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).




openly avowed their contempt for Blacks. For example, Repre-
sentative George Terrell, Democrat of Texas and farm employer
of Black workers, wrote to his sole Black colleague, Representa-
tive Oscar De Priest, Republican of Illinois, that he was
not in favor of social equality between the races. If there
[were] enough Negroes around the Capitol to justify a
restaurant for them to patronize, [he] would have no
objection to establishing a restaurant for their use. [He
could] neither eat nor sleep with the Negroes, and no law
could make [him] do so.
153
In the end, the House of Representatives affirmed the codifica-
tion of southern White supremacist traditions by excluding
Blacks from its restaurant.
154
Even after the Social Security Act went into effect, Black
organizations continued to remind the Roosevelt administration
of its racial impact. Thus, on January 4, 1937, the National
Urban League sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt
urging amendatory legislative action: "Because the majority of
Negro workers are in domestic or agricultural employments,
the benefits of the Social Security Act are denied to them."
155
The memorandum also placed this discrimination in the
context of the overall racial bias of the New Deal programs. It
suggested, for example, that the federal government ban racial
discrimination by contractors on public works projects, "in-
crease the number of Negro assistants in its various agencies
in order to facilitate the carrying out of the government policy
of non-discrimination in relief and work relief," and rectify
discrimination in the Cotton Belt, where thirty-five percent of
Whites had work relief compared to eighteen percent of Blacks,
and White families received twice as much in relief than did
Black households.
156
153. Letter from Rep. George B. Terrell to Rep. Oscar De Priest (n.d.), reprinted
in 78 CONG. REC. H5049 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1934).
154. Rudwick, supra note 145, at 77, 81. Nor was Congress alone in maintaining
Jim Crow. In Washington, D.C. during the 1930s, "[miore of the government offices
separate[d] Negro workers and exclude[d] them from the restaurant concessions in
the buildings than accept[ed] them." CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO
SEGREGATION 7 (1943).
155. Memorandum from the National Urban League to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Jan. 4, 1937), quoted in Negroes File Plea on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1937, at 7.
156. Id.
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IV. THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT ON BLACK AMERICANS OF
EXCLUDING FARM WORKERS FROM
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
A. Historical Impact
The actual discriminatory impact of the Social Security Act
on Blacks corresponded closely to the predictions that Black
organizations had made to Congress.'57 Because of the agricul-
tural and domestic service exclusion most Black workers did
not receive UI benefits. In a contemporaneous doctoral disser-
tation, Frank Davis calculated that, based on the 1930 census,
revealing almost two-thirds of all Black gainful workers
excluded from coverage by virtue of their work in agriculture
and domestic service, only "8.8 percent of the total gainfully
employed Negro workers are now actually accumulating
taxable earnings and satisfying the conditions of eligibility for
old age and unemployment insurance. " 58
The race-specific impact of the exclusion of farm workers
from Social Security is understated by the aggregate data for
agriculture, which include farmers. Yet even these figures show
that in 1930, forty percent of all Black, and thirty-eight percent
of all Mexican workers were employed in agriculture, compared
to only nineteen percent of Whites. 159 If only "employees" are
considered, however, the gap widens. The class, "employees,"
should not be confined to those whom the Census Bureau
labeled "wageworkers" within the larger group of "farm labor-
ers." This inappropriately narrow definition of employees
followed, according to the Social Security Board, from
the census practice of considering sharecroppers as farm
operators .... There is, however, a strong basis for consid-
ering them as hired employees of the plantation owners. It
is usually considered that a primary condition of an
employer-employee relationship is the ownership of the
tools of production by the employer, and that this condition
157. See supra notes 76-80, 109-28 and accompanying text.
158. Davis, supra note 138, at 90, 97.
159. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIFTEENTH CENSUS
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, 5 POPULATION: GENERAL REPORT ON OCCUPATIONS 76
tbl. 3, 86 tbl. 4 (1933) [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS I].
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is fundamental to employee insecurity. By this criterion, it
is clear that sharecroppers should be regarded as employ-
ees .... 160
If sharecroppers are included with wage workers, then, in
1930, the proportion of Black workers excluded from Social
Security by virtue of their status as agricultural employees was
nineteen percent, more than three times greater than that of
White workers, six percent of whom were excluded.
16 1
The race-specific impact of the exclusion of farm workers
from the unemployment insurance program was magnified by
the fact that the farms and plantations that would have been
included, if agricultural employers with eight employees had
been covered under the federal UI tax provision, 162 were con-
centrated in areas-the South, California, Arizona, and New
Mexico-where Black and Mexican farm workers clearly pre-
dominated.6 3 In the South, for example, the Black farm laborer
had had "the field of farm labor to himself" since the end of the
nineteenth century. 164 These fourteen states accounted for
seventy-five percent of all farms with eight or more workers
and seventy-nine percent of all farm workers in 1935.161
160. Wendzel, supra note 113, at 568. The staff reports of the CES not only agreed
that [croppers are practically hired laborers ... [and] are as a class almost
constantly without resources with which to meet unemployment," but expressly took
note of the fact that in 1930, 43% ofall "colored" farm "owner-operators" were croppers
compared with only 7% of Whites. Josiah C. Folsom, Economic Security of Farmers
and Agricultural Workers, in ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 110, at 808, 811, 835
tbl. II.
161. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS I, supra note 159, at 76 tbl. 3; BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1930,3 AGRICULTURE: TYPE OF FARM, PART 2-THE SOUTHERN STATES 35 tbl. 9 (1932).
Because the 1930 Census of Agriculture classified Mexican and Mexican-American
sharecroppers as White, it is not possible to compute the percentage of excluded
workers for this ethnic group.
162. See Social Security Act, ch. 31, § 907, 49 Stat. 620, 642-43 (1935) (applying
text to employees with eight or more employees, while excluding all agricultural
labor).
163. LINDER, supra note 6, at 165-66, 169.
164. 19 FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 89, H.R. DOC. No. 380, 57th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1902).
165. Wendzel, supra note 113, at 564-67 (calculation based on statistics from
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia).
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B. Current Impact
The original exclusion of farm workers from the unemploy-
ment compensation provision of the Social Security Act had,
and continues to have, a disproportionate impact on the
nonwhite majority of agricultural workers, who were and
remain vastly overrepresented in the agricultural work force.
Exactly what proportion of farm workers today are members
of such minorities is impossible to determine. As the Commis-
sion on Agricultural Workers recently acknowledged, "no
national survey ... accurately counts the people that the
industry employs."'66 This official ignorance of the number of
agricultural workers is emblematic of public indifference
toward them. It is ironic that the chief obstacle to the collection
of accurate employment data is the threefold subject matter of
this very Article-the lack of universal coverage for farm
workers under unemployment compensation statutes, the
noncompliance with their obligations by employers who are
covered, and the lack of enforcement of these obligations by the
Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration,
United States Department of Labor, and state employment
agencies.
Within the limitations of the current data, the National Agri-
cultural Workers Survey (NAWS), recently established by the
Department of Labor, makes possible an estimation of the pro-
portion of farm workers who are racial and ethnic minorities.
The NAWS samples workers performing seasonal agricultural
services (SAS) related to all crops but excludes livestock.'67 For
1990, NAWS found that 62% of all SAS workers were
foreign-born: 57% were Mexican, 2% were of other Latin origin,
1% were non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and 2% were
Asian. 168 An additional 13% were U.S.-born Hispanics, while
2% were African Americans. 169 In other words, 77% of SAS
workers were members of racial and ethnic minorities and only
23% were Whites. In 1993-1994, the percentage of Whites
166. COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, supra note 4, at 1.
167. NAWS, supra note 22, at 3.




declined to 17%.170 Virtually the entire large subset of SAS
workers who are migrant farm workers and most in need of
protection against the severe disemployment effects of seasonal
agricultural patterns are non-White: in 1989-1991, eighty-five
percent were born abroad-ninety-five percent of them in Latin
America; ten percent were U.S.-born Hispanics. In all, ninety-
nine percent of all migrant farm workers "are, or have immedi-
ate family members who are, Hispanic or foreign-born."17'
Today Latinos, Blacks, and other discrete and insular racial
minorities, constitute about one-fifth of the total U.S. popula-
tion and work force.' 72 Yet, based on estimates of non-SAS
livestock and poultry workers, who are currently excluded from
the NAWS survey, the latter's directors estimate that members
of racial minority groups may make up seventy to seventy-five
percent of the entire agricultural work force.
173
The racially based exclusion of farm workers from UI in 1935
had its intended results-it denied protection to African
Americans to a much greater degree than it harmed White
Americans. This disparate impact was particularly pronounced
in the South. Today's partial exclusion of farm workers from
the FUTA has an even greater disproportionate impact on
Black and Mexican-origin workers.
CONCLUSION
Although past racial injustice may not be easily corrected in
Congress, prospective relief from discrimination against farm
workers under UI requires only two simple changes in the
FUTA.174 First, the special definitions for agricultural coverage
170. Telephone Interview with Ruth Samardick, U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23, 1995).
171. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MIGRANT FARMWORKERS: PURSUING SECURITY IN AN
UNSTABLE LABOR MARKET 19 (1994).
172. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE; CENSUS OF POPULATION:
GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: UNITED STATES 3 tbl. 3 (1993) (tabulations
by authors).
173. See NAWS 1989, supra note 22, at 1 n.1; Richard Mines et al., The
Latinization of U.S. Farm Labor, REP. ON AM., July 1992, at 40, 41; Telephone
Interview with Beatriz Boccalandro, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Apr. 26, 1994); Telephone
Interview with Richard Mines, U.S. Dep't of Labor (May 18, 1994).
174. The compulsory nature of the FUTA on the states ensures that these changes
will be adopted at the state level. Because 90% of a state-imposed UI tax (up to 5.4%
of covered wages) can be credited against the FUTA levy, states can enact a UI tax
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in § 3306, distinguishing farm workers and their employment
from all other industries, should be repealed.'75 Second, to
ensure that the equal coverage provided by this change will not
be subverted by the use of crew leaders against whom report-
ing requirements are practically unenforceable, 176 the special
rule for crew leader use should be changed to place reporting
and tax-paying responsibility on the grower. The amended
provision should read:
SPECIAL RULE IN CASE OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS.
CREW LEADERS WHO PROVIDE AGRICULTURAL LABOR. For
purposes of this chapter, any individual who is a member
of a crew furnished by a crew leader to perform agricultural
labor for any other person shall be treated as an employee
of such other person, unless substantially all the members
of such crew operate or maintain tractors, mechanized har-
vesting or cropdusting equipment, or any other mechanized
equipment, which is provided by such crew leader.
After sixty years of discrimination, these changes would
finally bring farm workers into the UI system on the same
basis as all other workers. Providing a stable source of income
to these workers during periods of unemployment will help
hundreds of thousands of workers and their families. It will
correct decades of injustice and have very little impact on the
cost of farm products. This impact can be determined by
looking at states that currently cover farm workers. In such
states, the average agricultural UI tax rates are in the four
percent range of taxable wages, and less than four percent of
total wages.1 77 For some of the most labor intensive crops, such
as fruit and vegetable production, labor costs are twenty to
thirty percent of the total value of farm products.17 Using
on their employers and increase their revenues without increasing taxes. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 3301-5302 (1994).
175. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(2), (c)(1) (1994).
176. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
177. In California, for example, the maximum UI tax rate was 5.4% in 1994. Phillip
L. Martin, Immigration, Agriculture, and Unemployment Insurance 16 n.26 (Aug. 16,
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform). The average farm employer paid UI taxes of 2.5% of total wages paid.
Id. This was 4.3% of taxable wages, since all wages are not taxable for UI in California
or in any other state. Id.
178. Id. at 4. These commodities have a total farm value of $25 billion annually
and a labor cost of $5 to $8 billion annually. Id.
VOL. 29:1&2
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
these two figures, both of which are on the high side when used
for the industry as a whole, the total increase in costs of farm
products on farms not currently covered and paying UI result-
ing from coverage of farm workers is between 0.8% and 1.2%.
Thus, the cost to farmers, whom the current exclusion is now
subsidizing, will be minimal-on the order of one percent of
production costs in labor intensive crops. The largest farmers
are now paying these costs, as are all farmers in states such
as California and Washington that have essentially first dollar
coverage for farm workers.17 9 A change in the FUTA will
equalize competitive conditions for all farmers. If there are
policy reasons to subsidize smaller farmers on the basis of size,
then the subsidies should be direct and not imposed on the
backs of destitute employees.
Placing UI reporting and taxpaying responsibility on grow-
ers, even when they use crew leaders as intermediaries, should
add no additional costs, unless the crew leaders have unlawful-
ly failed to report wages and pay taxes in the past."18 However,
it may require growers to assume these responsibilities from
compliant crew leaders and reduce such crew leaders' compen-
sation accordingly.
The approach to this issue by the Advisory Council on Unem-
ployment Compensation, making growers responsible only
where taxes have not been paid, has been tried in Texas and
does not work.'' The defect in this approach is as simple as it
is fatal. The state cannot assess taxes against the grower, and
cannot credit workers' wages for UI compensation purposes,
unless it obtains records from the crew leader showing the
wages paid to particular workers on the farm. Crew leaders
who have failed to report and pay UI taxes seldom can be
179. See supra notes 32, 44-47 and accompanying text. Agriculture, like many
other industries, does not pay enough in UI taxes to cover benefits paid to its workers.
It is what is known as a "negative reserve industry." In California, agricultural
employers paid in $70 million in 1992, but the state paid out $190 million. Martin,
supra note 177, at 23. All states have maximum UI tax rates, causing lower-cost
industries to subsidize higher-cost industries. The most subsidized industries in
Washington during 1993 were commercial sports, manufacturing, commercial printing,
operative builders, and real estate operators. Five additional industries received more
subsidies than did agriculture. TASK FORCE ON UI, SOCIALIZED COSTS AND EXPERIENCE
RATING ISSUES 10 (1993).
180. See supra notes 53, 55.
181. See ACUC, supra note 4, at 13 (recommending responsibility where crew
leaders owe UI insurance). Its failure in Texas is the observation of author Larry
Norton.
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found with such incriminating records.1 2 As a result, this
approach is not a solution to the "noncompliant crew leader"
problem. The UI system is designed to function with accurate
employer wage reporting. This reporting will occur in agricul-
ture only if reporting responsibility is clearly placed on the
person to whom the crew leader provides workers.
Current leaders in Washington, D.C. are Southerners from
Arkansas and Georgia. Let them go down to Weslaco in the Rio
Grande Valley and tell the thousands of migrant farm workers
that they will end the racial injustice that has excluded these
workers from UI, minimum wage, and overtime. Perhaps this
is a "revolution" that can unite the New Age thinking of a Bill
Clinton and a Newt Gingrich, sons of the South putting to rest
another racist chapter in our nation's history.
182. Telephone Interview with Kristy Doss, Unemployment Tax Specialist and
Supervisor of the Lubbock, Texas office (Mar. 10, 1995).
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